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and public defenders
'l'he salaries paid district
are not a proper measure for
the compensation
allowable to attorneys appointed to defend those charged with
erime. \Vith sueh positions go prestige and a certain steady
income which may in a measure account for the differcnee
between it and the cost of handling the legal work on a piece
basis. These offieiais have no overhead expense as do attorneys
engaged in private practice and all expenses illcurred by sueh
offieials in the investigation and handling of criminal cases
are paid out of public fuu<l:-:. Moreover, it is a matter of
comrnon knowledge that the salaries of' govc~rnment officers do
not match what they woul(l receive for similar work in private
activities whether it be legal or administrative work.
I would issue the writ on the ground that the court abused
its discretion although I believe the order is appealable. It is
not an order made after judgment substantially affecting the
judgment but is a final order in a special civil procePding
which is made appealable b~· section 963, subdivision 1, of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Schaner, .J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 19100.

In Bank.

Feb. 10, 1956.]

GEORGE G. EICHELBERGER et aL, Appellants, v. CITY
OF BERKEI.~EY et al., Respondents.
LEWIS WESCO'l'T, Appellant, v. CI'l'Y OF BERKELEY
et al., Respondents.
[1] Pensions-Amount.-Where a pension statute states that the
pension shall be a pcrePntage of the average salary attached
to the rank held by the employee before retirement, it is construed as providing for a fluctuating pension which increases
or decreases as the salnrirs paid to active employees increase
or decrease.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Fire Department-Pensions.--Where
a city ordinnnee expressly provides that pensions to retired
firemPn shall not fluetunte np or down in accordance with pay
Jluctuations of aeti ve firemen, reti rl'd firemen are not en-

[1] SP(; Cal.Jur., Pensions,
McK. Dig. References: [1]
porations, § 324(5).

~

6; Am.Jur., J>Pnsions, ~~ 32, 33.
8;
:1) ::\lunicipal Cor-
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reason of any pay
ordinance is snb~
the word "increase" and to
"shall not decrease
amendment carries the im~
be increased in accordance
with the fluctuation in pay of active firemen and indicates
that the ordinance was intended to apply to existing penin view of the rule~ that pension laws must
"'"'"'·'"''"" to achieve their beneficent purposes.
Id.-Fire Department-Pensions.-Where a city ordinance is
amended to authorize inereases in pensions to retired firemen
the basis. of
increases to aetive firemen, application
the amendment to existing pensioners from its effective date
not retroactive inasmuch as pension payments are a eonobligation and the ordinance is being applied only to
thereafter payable. (Disapproving Jordan v. Retirement Board, 35 Cal.App.2d 653, 96 P.2d 973, and Holmberg
Oakland, 55 CalApp. 270, 203 P. 167.)

from a judgment of the Superior Court of AlaCounty. CeeillYiosbaeher, Judge. Reversed with direeActions to recover amounts allegedly accrued as payments
from pensions and death benefits, and for declaratory
Judgment for defendants reversed with directions.
Cornish & Cornish, Francis T. Cornish and Howard W.
for Appellants.
C. Hutchinson and Robert T. Anderson for ReCARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for decity of Berkeley, in consolidated actions by plaintiffs
to recover amounts allegedly accrued as payments due from
nensJ'on.s. and in some cases, death benefits, alleged to be paydefendant, and for declaratory relief.
!<uuLJ:lli:S Eichelberger and Wescott, here appealing, retired
ner•;ur1e entitled to pensions after long service as firemen
by defendant. Their retirement commenced on July
and February 25, 1939, respectively. Plaintiff Elsie
also appealing, is entitled to a pension as widow
Haggerty who died on August 18, 1938, in the line

lei.tuauL,
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serv1ce as a flreman in the employ of
of
dPf't•ndant.
number 2188-N
Defendant
J 9:18. It authorized retirement and
members of
fi1·e
who had theretofore served or
should tlH'rt'aftrr fWtTO for a
number of y0ars. l<.,or
those
the
vvas to be "one half of the average
attaehet1 to the rank or ranks held
the three
.nan;
the date of retirement.'' In the
(·ase of the >vidow of a fireman, killed in line of duty, the
percentage was to be one third. Section 24 of that ordinance
read: "The pensions granted under the terms of this ordiuaw•e shall not 1'ncrease nor decrease with any changes in
snbsr•quent to the date of the granting of the pension
for the rallk or ranlm npon which the pension vms based, nor
shall any changes of title or rank in the active service effect
an increase or reduction in the existing pensions." (Italics
ours.) Effeetiye April20, 1939, defendant adopted Ordinanee
Number 2254-N.S. amending Ordinance Number 2188-N.S.,
supra. One eha11ge here pertinent was in section 24, supra.
'!'he amendment eliminated the ·words italicized in tile above
qnot ation of section 24 in its original form.*
']'here haye been salary inerrases in thr positions formerly
held by Haggerty sinee his death and by plaintiffs Eiehelberger and \Vescott sinee their retirement and plaintiffs elaim
that they are entitled to haye their pensions inereaserl aecordingly. 'rhey claim that under the original 1938 ordinanee
(2188-N.S.) they are so entitled and if not they are entitled
to inereased pensions because of the increase in firemen's pay
since the 1939 amendment. (2144-N.S.) Defendant elaims
that section 24, s11pra, of the 1938 ordinanee exelnded a pension 1vhieh would fluetnate up or down aeeording to the pay of
firemen, and to apply the 1939 amendment to plaintiffs, ·who
.,.Tn 1!144 Onlinanee Number 2188·N.S. was again amended. It was
recited that it was the intention of the eitv council that by that ordinance there wn s to l1e ''a fixed amount, whiJh 1\·ould neither increase nor
deerease'' and clrrrifie;Jtion was necessary, hence section 24 was amended
to read: ''Tho TlCnsionR granted under the terms of this ordinance
shall he based upon the nverage monthly rate of salary which sueh
members shrrll han) rereiYcd during the three years immediately pre·
ceding the date of retirement, and shall be for a fixed amount that shall
not inerease nor decrc>1se, regardless of any change in salary subsequent
to the date of grnnting of the pensions for the rank or ranks that the
members held prior to tbe granting of the pensions." It was held in
Terry v. City of
41 Cal.2d G98 [263 P.2d 833], that that
amendment could not
persons who, lil'e plaintiffs, retired before
it became effective.

OF BErtKEJ,EY
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them

inceeases or decreases as
increase or decrease.
swpra, 41 CaL2d 698 ;
!34 [56 P.2d 237]; English v.
Brach,
414
P.2l1
; Aitken v. Roche, 48 Cal.
1192 P. 464]; Klcnch v. Board
Pension Fnncl
Conus., 79 Cal.App. 171 [249 P. 46]; Ruwetscll v. Davie,

+7

512 [190 P. 10751 )
to plaintiffs' contention lhe

rule

of t·onslrnction of the abovp mentioned 1ang:nage does not

sneh an inconsisteney \Yith seet ion 24 of the J !138 ordixupm. that it mnst haYe the e!1'ed of' ov<'niding that
The· whole onlinancle mnst be read to properly con'l'hns, ·while the language mentioned, standing alone,
of, and will be given the eonstrnetion stated in
case, section 2"1 sprcifically covrrs the situation,
provides that pensions shall not flnctuate np
in accordanee \Yith 11ay ftuetuat ions of aetive firemen.
tlear, therefore, that for the period from the date of
ret irpn;ent in the ease of plaintiffs Eielwlberger nnd \Vescott
and i
date of death in the easl' o!' Haggert.v to the effectiYr
the 193!1 amendment of the ordinanee, said plaintiffR
entitled to an;v increase in thrir r)ensions by reason
of
pa~~ increase for 11etiYe :Arenwn. 'l'his brings 11s, then,
effeet of the 1D:\!J amendment and an;: pay inc·rease:.;
effective date on the am01mt of pension to whieh plainentitled. 'rhe ] !1:30 amPndment remowtl th<' language
in
24 whieh yn·eYt'nted tlle applit:ation of the rule
ail!Hi11lWed in the Ten·~, l'HSc', and hence tmcler it.
do
as the pay of adin~ firemen is inen'asetl. Moreoyrr,
the
in1plieation of the ] !):l!) amemlmrnt is that the rnle
in
ease shall prevail lJe,·mtse it sa~·s, as the 1!1:38
orrlinnnee (lid, that a (lrerem;e in the pay of aetiYe firemen
shall not reduce the pension. 'l'he inference is that an illen•m;c

1·rt'a1e
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in pay should increase the pension. Therefore, if the 1939
amendment applies to plaintiffs, they are entitled to snch illcrease in the amount of their pensions aR will be reflected
from any pay increase for active firemen.
At the time of the 1939 amendment of section 24 of Ordinance Number 2188-N.S., section 7 was also amended to restate
the law as it formerly existed insofar as it is here pertinent,
that any member of the fire department at the effective date
of the ordinance or thereafter shall receive a pension which,
on reaehing various ages, shall be a percentage of ''the average
salary attaehed to the rank or ranks held during the three
years immediately preceding the date of retirement''; the
same is true of the death benefit provisions ( §§ 11 and 13).
The 1939 amendment to section 24 restated it as it previously
existed with the deletion of the words above mentioned ancl
provided that the pensions ''granted'' nnder the ordinanee
shall not be decreased, ·which carries the implication that they
will be increased in aecordance with the fluctuation in pay of
active firemen. The foregoing clearly indicates that the ordinance was intended to apply to existing pensioners especially
when we bear in mind the rule that pension laws must be
liberally construed to achieve their beneficent purposes (Terry
v. City of Berkeley, s1tpra, 41 Cal.2d 698). In this connection
it has been said: ''Another consideration in the matter of
providing pensions for retired civil officers, and not the least in
importance, is to pay such retirement compensation as will
provide for the retired officer or employee means of proper subsistence. An increase in the cost of living always justly calls
for an increase in the compensation of those who labor to earn
a livelihood, and this proposition obviously applies as well to
those who labor for the public as those engaged in private
employment, and, of course, equally so to those who, for
reasons prescribed by law, have been retired from a public
service to which they devoted many years of faithful adherence. \Ye may add the observation that members of police and
fire departments of a city are required as such to perform
public duties always beset by imminent perils to their lives
and limbs-indeed, more than any other officers or employees
engaged in the civil department of the public service. It is,
therefore, not at all strange but gratifying to flnd that the
government, as in the present instance, so far as poliee officers
are concenJPd, has bePn just enough to make sueh provision
for the compensatio11 of such officers or employees as affords
not only a fair reward to them Yrhile they are actively per-

.F.iiCHELBERGER

v.

CITY OP BERKELEY

187

[46 C.2d 1R2; 293 P.2d 1]

to im:un• th<'lll, aecord.
eouditions as to tlw eost of li\·ing,
want or prnury after they have been compelled from
nlated YPHI'S or from ph,vsical disabilities inwrred
of thPir pnblie dnties to 'lay down the
aw1 the hoe.' " (Elench v. Board of Pension Fund
CuJili'S., supra, 79 CaLApp. 171, 189.)
In Swcesy v. Los
Retirement Board, 17 Cal.2d 356 [110 P.2d 37],
the increase in pension benefits was expressly made
it was also stated at page 361 : ''It must be
as tile settled law of this state that unless the contrary
plainly appears persons having a pensionable status
to receive any increase of benefits which may be
Sweesy's pension rights vested at the time he was
from service, that is, upon the happening of the conupon whieh the pensionable right depended.'' In
on other casE's the court said at page 360: ''In
v. Board of Pension Puncl Oomrs., snpra, it was held
that uudcr the law there involved a pensioner was entitled
to the benefits afforded by the increases in the pay attaehed
to tlic nmk he held at the time of his retirement, and that his
to payment was not limited to the amount he was receiving
the time of his retirement. The conclusion was based
on f !w observation that one who has been r·egularly placed on
the
rolt is entitled to aU the benefits of the system.
The
followed Aitken v. Roche, s1tpra, wherein it was held
that nnder the system and the charter provisions the pensioner
\YilS afforded the benefits of subsequent inereases in the pay
attaehed to the rank he held at the time of retirement.''
added.) In Brurnnwnd v. City of Oakland, 111
CaU\pp.2d 114 [244 P.2cl 441], the fireman was an 0mployee
aw1 member of the retirement system when the city charter
was amended in 1943 to give a widow of a fireman who died
\Yhilv h1 service from a nonscrviee cause $1,000 (whieh had
been the ease I or a return of all the contributions
the fireman, whichever the widow chose. Plaintiff's
died in 1950 and it was held she could reeover the
amount contributed including that contributed prior to 1943,
tbe eourt stating at page 117: "As the section states that in
the CTent of the death of a member under the circumstances
therl•in set forth, his widow shall elect wh0ther to reeeive
$1,000 or the 'refund of all such sums as have been deducted
from his pay and contributed to' the fund, it is obvious that
this wonlc1 include the sums paid before the amendment as
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eon tend
, that the
were not eontributhe amendment a
of public moneys
our case
~00~

are
~

visions of any
seetion but 'of all such sums as
deduetcd' from the firemen pay and contributed
to the fund. rrhns therr is no
intention of the Legislaturr to limit the refunds to sums deducted at any particular time. In determining ·whether section 104(2) is to
apply
to moneys deducted after its enactment date, the
rule set forth in Cordell v.
of Los A1tgeles, 67 CaLApp.
2d 257, 266 [ 154 P .2d 31], must be borne in mind: 'Neither
can 1ve be unmindful of the rule so firmly established in this
state that pension legislation must be liberally construed and
applied to the end that the beneficent results of such legislation may be achieved. Pension provisions in our law are
founded upon sound
policy and with the objects of
protecting, in a proper case, the pensioner and his dependents
against economic insecurity. ln order to confer the benefits
snch legislation should be applied fairly and
broadly.' " In Busch v. Tunwr, 26 Cal.2d 817 [161 P.2d
456, 171 A.L.I\.. 1063], the Legislature in 1943 amended the
statute :fixing the salary of the district attorney stating that
the district attorney should receive a salary of $2,400; it
had formerly been $1,800. The court said: "The 1943 legislation ·was sufficiently broad in its terms to include incum,' that
persons holding the office ·when the amendment
was made, and further, ''A statute purporting, in general
terms, to increase salaries would ordinarily be construed to
include incumbents . . . . '' In harmony with that line of
reasoning it has been held that an amendment to a pension
law which increases the amount of the pensions applies to
those already retired. (Boar-cl of Tr-ustees of Policemen's
Pension FundY. Sclwpp. 223 Ky. 269 [3 S.W.2d 606] ; People
Y. Board of Truslces of Firemen's Pension F1lnd, 103 Colo.
1 [82 P.2d 765]; McNichols v. Walton, 120 Colo. 269 [208
P.2d 1156) ; sec Ridgley v. Board of Trustees, 371 Ill. 409
[21 N.E.2d 286) ; Raines v. Board of Trustees, 365 Ill. 610
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If.'n\'('

system is estabor
ve~trd whm the
clonbted that the Hl:l9
to firemrn then in the
scrYWP. ;{o
apply to an
bceause he has retired.
ilcflla Cas. ([;
lmlus!rial Ace.
30
P .2d
, is rea\l
bet be employer's liability was fixrd
ieh >Yns not merely an antecedent faet.
is only
antrerdent fact breanse the pension
one and has foree from the tim<'

Allen

Y.

City

Beach,

P.2d 7ELJ]), :mel the retirement does not
' rights insofar ns the instant ease is
32 Ca1.2d 700 ]197 P .2d
.L.H.2d ~124], we held that an amendment to a statute
iuterest on taxes
un(1rr
to the state
to a rr<:ovrry of taxes after the effective date
amendment even though the recoyery of interest was
~when the taxes ·were paid, nnd distinguished the
ou the grmmcl that the amendment operated on
future.' en•Dts. (See 11lso Record v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 103
CaL\
·±:34
P.2J
.)
relied upon by <lefenc!ant sneh as O'D!!a v. Cook,
G59 [169 P. 366], Jordan \~. Retirement Board, ::~:J
6:"53 [!JG P.2c1 973], Clurney Y. Los
County
59 Ca1.App.2d 413
P.2d 73;'5],
v. City of Oakland, ,)5 Ca1.~\pp. 270 [203 P. 167],
1J v. En11Jloyecs Retirement
71 Cnl.App.2d
P .2cl 9:39], are (l isti11
In tlw 0 'Dea case
was whetlwr an am<~11<1ment
a time limit
~within one year aftl•r
would ent off ihe widow
of an
previously injured, who later died, and the
co11rt felt not "<~ompelle(1" io give a rHroactive effect to the
amendment. As was pointed 011t in Kent
City of Long
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Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 851 [179 P.2d 799], the O'Dea case
considered the pension as vested and not subject to be taken
away. In the Chaney case the change in the law would ad.
versely affect the pensioner and the language indicated the
pensioner could choose the old law or the new law. In the
Brophy case the statute by its language was prospective and
construed to apply to those then receiving
We do
not have language and legislative action equivalent to that
used here iu any of the cited cases. The Jordan and Holm.
berg cases are out of harmony with the cases hereinabove
discussed and are disapproved.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed
to enter judgment in accordance ·with the views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., Spence,
.T., and McComb, ,J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 19357.

In Bank.

Feb. 10, 1956.]

GIPSON E. SIMMONS, Appellant, v. RHODES AND
JAMIESON, LTD. (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Sales-Warranties-Merchantability.-"Merchantable quality"

means that the substance sold is reasonably suitable for the
ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet.
[2] Id.- Warranties-Merchantability.-Where ready-mixed cement purchased to lay a concrete basement floor was fit for
that purpose, this was the only purpose for which the test
of merchantability could be applied.
[3] Id.-Warranties-Cement.-A seller of ready-mixed cement
need not warn the buyer that it will burn the skin, especially
where the buyer knows that quicklime, which has a caustic
effect, is one of the necessary ingredients of cement.
[4] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of Rule.-In an
action by a buyer of ready-mixed cement against the seller for
burns sustained while using the cement, the doctrine of res
[1] See Cal.Jur., SalPs, § 66 et seq.; Am.Jur., Sales, § 341 et seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur., ?\Pglig-ence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence,
§ 295 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Sales,§ 131(1); [:3] Sales,§ 134.5;
[4, 5] Negligence,§ 138; [6] Negligence,§ 135; [7] Evidence,§ 18;
[8] Negligence, § 177.

